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responses are more consistent, and they are easier to handle. Their im­
munological response to antigens (vaccines), blood protein levels, and abilities to 
convert feed into growth and to resist stresses are all increased. Some differences 
between experimental groups can only be demonstrated with birds which have 
been handled with TLC. Genetic selection for many factors can only be done with 
chickens receiving TLC and ideal physical environments. When chickens are not 
well cared for, environmental effects tend to mask their genetic potential. 
To summarize, experimental animals which are exposed to TLC under good 
environmental circumstances are truly superior. In addition, they experience less 
trauma, and fewer are needed to obtain better quality results. 
Animals employed in agriculture have similar problems to those used in 
labs. Back in the days when poultry flocks were small, their environmental and 
disease stresses were high. However, many of the flock owners had a real feeling 
for the birds and understood their behavior. As flocks became larger, the en­
vironmental and disease stresses were reduced. Administrators became more and 
more remote from the birds and tended to think more about their physical needs. 
than about their social ones. As the size of flocks increased, even those in direct 
contact with the birds h�d less time to be cognizant of their social needs, much 
less to satisfy them. Furthermore, the competitive process in the marketplac.e 
which resulted in increased quality of products at decreased cost to the con­
sumer tended to relegate animals to the status of things. However, this feeling is 
far from universal. Many people who work with poultry today have developed an 
understanding of their behavioral and social needs and therefore treat them gent­
ly and with compassion. The birds perform better, and the caring people make 
more profits than the uncaring. Similarly, dairy cattle and other domestic animals 
which are exposed to TLC are easier to work with, more productive and of course 
more profitable. Again, as in the case of laboratory animals, TLC is indirectly 
beneficial to humans. 
TLC is known to be an important aid in training animals. The most impressive 
trainers are those who are able to obtain superb cooperation and responses from 
animals without uttering harsh words or inflicting pain. 
TLC is an attitude and as such cannot be put into force through legislation. 
What is needed to foster a caring attitude is more widespread knowledge about 
animal behavior and appreciation of the animals' needs by those who work with 
them. Toward this aim, humane societies should increase their educational ef­
forts directed at those who use animals as pets, in research, in testing and in 
agriculture. Greater understanding of an animal's behavior results in respect for 
and compassion toward animals in general. With tender loving care, the animal's 
life is made more pleasant and the human's endeavors are more satisfactory. 
Humane societies should also promote research on animal behavior, par­
ticularly of animals that are closely associated with man. Moreover, they should 
encourage colleges and universities to require courses in animal behavior for all 
students who might work with animals after graduation. Among these students 
are those studying biology, psychology, animal agriculture and veterinary and 
human medicine. These people are especially important because they are likely 
to have future decision-making power. Their actions and attitudes toward 
animals will influence those with whom they work. They should be strong ad­
vocates of TLC. 
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TLC is not a relic of the past. Those who are presently obtaining the best 
results from their work with animals are using it right now. 
The "Reasonable Ground" as a Problem of the 
German Animal Protection Act 
Gotthard M. Teutsch, Editorial Advisory Board 
The German Animal Protection Act has been widely praised for its high 
ethical aims. Indeed, the law's intentions as well as its specific prohibitions 
should help to ensure a remarkably advanced stage of animal protection in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. However, laws can provide only a degree of deter­
rence. Humane conduct depends more on moral consciousness than on the fear 
of penalty. 
How Effective is the Law? 
One measure of the efficiency of a law is the associated number of sen­
tenced violations. Other val id criteria for judgment exist, but it is difficult to ig­
nore the fact that the number of sentences has been steadily decreasing since the 
animal protection law went into effect in 1972. According to an estimate by K.D. 
Wiegand (1979), only one out of every 5000 (unnotified as well as notified) of­
fenses in the Federal Republic of Germany result in prosecution and sentencing. 
The interpretive freedom allowed by the German Animal Protection Act is a 
major source of its ineffectiveness in that it leaves the judge with no objective 
criteria on which to base a decision. This uncertainty stems in part from the 
newly-introduced phrase, "reasonable ground," a term assumed to be helpful in 
evaluating judicial arguments. In reading the term "reasonable ground," the 
philosophical and ethical meaning of the word "reason" cannot be overlooked. 
Obviously, not every intellectually understandable cause can be accepted as a 
"reasonable ground" (von Loeper, 1979). Hence the uncertainty. 
Commentaries on the Meaning of "Reasonable Grounds" 
Paragraph 1 of the German Animal Protection Act states the law's fun­
damental aim and gives the general directive under which exceptions can be 
made: "This act serves the protection and well-being of animals. No one may be 
permitted to inflict pain, suffering or damage upon an animal without reasonable
grounds" (emphasis added). Although no formal explanation of the term 
"reasonable ground" is offered, one can assume that a) all actions explicitly per­
mitted by the Act are justified as being based on "reasonable grounds," and that 
b) all actions explicitly prohibited by the Act are unjustifiable because they
evidently lack "reasonable grounds."
When situations arise which are not expressly discussed in the Act, the judge 
must make his or her own decision as to what constitutes "reasonable grounds" 
for exempting a particular action from the proscriptions of the law. The latitude 
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involved in making a judgement is a general problem of jurisdiction and can be 
found in connection with animal welfare legislation of other countries. Various 
commentators on the German Animal Protection Act have explored this problem 
and attempted to delineate categories of justifiable versus unjustifiable actions. 
According to A. Lorz (1979), "reasonable grounds" for the killing or ill­
treatment of animals do not include: annoyance, antipathy, disgust, aversion, 
boredom, 'devilry', whim, indolence, lust for hunting, planning or veiling a crim­
inal offense, rage, vengeance, firearm training, sensationalism, vandalism, wan­
tonness, weariness or working off emotional excitement. 
Professor H. Kraft (1972), one of the experts who participated in the delibera­
tions which preceded the final drafting of the German Animal Protection Act, 
tried to develop a system of superior, inferior, or equivalent animal uses. Among 
those uses considered inferior are any of those connected with the fashion world, 
personal hobbies, sports or the arts if these uses inflict animal pain, suffering, 
damage or death. 
Another attempt to define the difference between "reasonable" and 
"unreasonable" grounds has been undertaken by E. Kadlec (1976). He concedes 
that man is entitled to make use of animals or plants in order to satisfy his vital 
needs. On the other hand, he rejects any misuse of animals or plants for the 
fulfillment of unrestrained wants. In distinguishing between needs and wants, 
Paragraph 9/1 of the Act acquires great importance. According to the regulation 
in this part of the Act, experimentation on living animals is not allowed if there is 
any possibility of attaining the desired result by a sound alternative method. The 
underlying principle of this regulation is that a "reasonable ground" exists only as 
long as the intended purpose cannot be achieved except through the use of 
animals. This principle can be generalized to other areas of animal exploitation. 
For example, the manufacture of fur coats may have been tolerable in former 
times, but it can no longer be justified in an age of mass production of textiles 
and fur substitutes which serve the same intended purposes. 
A New Definition 
I would like to present my own scheme for what constitutes "reasonable 
grounds," based on a combination of the attempts outlined above and pro­
ceeding from the assumption that purposes which are deemed justifiable entail 
the minimal necessary degree of pain, suffering or damage to the animal. 
Reasonable grounds for inflicting pain, suffering or damage upon an animal 
exist if: 
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1 . A person's I ife is being threatened by an attacking animal. (This does not in­
clude bullfighting or any other situation in which humans intentionally en­
danger themselves by inciting animals to attack.) 
2. Animal products are to be used for food.
3. Animal products, special organs or substances (e.g., sera) are to be used to
preserve human life and health.
4. Animals are to be used in experiments necessary to the preservation of
human life and health, provided that there is no alternative method of ex­
perimentation.
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5. Goods necessary to human life are being imperiled by animals.
Editorial 
Obviously, adherence to this code means that some of our traditional
customs and patterns of behavior must be changed. In particular, the following 
practices would have to be discontinued: 
1. Any killing of animals which does not fulfill vital human needs or which is
carried out under painful conditions. (This includes the renunciation of any
killing in order to obtain inessential products such as fur, etc.)
2. Painful experiments on and with living animals for nonvital purposes as well
as any experimental procedure which could be replaced by another
method.
3. The keeping of animals of whatever kind for whatever purpose under condi­
tions which disregard their well-being and natural behavior.
4. Sport hunting. (Hunting is tolerated only as an aid to wildlife management
or as a means of human survival.)
5. Fishing and harpooning as a sport or hobby.
6. Animal fighting or human-animal fighting which has been arranged for
human entertainment and/or profit.
7. Exhibition of animals under conditions which disregard their well-being and
natural behavior. This particularly concerns any form of inadequate living
conditions in zoos as well as inhumane treatment in circuses and rodeos.
I realize that any attempt to define a legal term which possesses strong
moral and philosophical overtones is bound to meet with some dissatisfaction. I 
myself cannot concede that the above formulations, though legally sound, are all 
totally justifiable from an ethical point of view. Some may find these definitions 
too radical, others may find them not radical enough. However, more radical 
definitions, which are not possible under the present law, would require a respec­
tive change in the ethical convictions of our society. 
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